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Stafleu has distinguished himself with ground-breaking work on the theoretical foundations 
of physics. Subsequently he has broadened his scope and entered the field of general 
philosophy – including reflections on artefacts and technology. In his assessment of what I 
have done in my 2009 work on Philosophy: Discipline of the disciplines he raises a number of 
issues to which I respond in what follows below. In some instances it appears that we opt for 
different designations of the same states of affairs, but different understandings do surface in 
some other cases. Stafleu’s objection to the expression ‘sphere sovereignty’ because ‘no modal 
aspect is ruled by a sovereign’ reveals a misunderstanding of metaphorical language, which 
prompts a brief discussion of analogies and metaphors. The complicated challenge to find an 
appropriate designation of the core meaning of the physical aspect receives some attention as 
well as the distinction between modal laws and type laws. The nature of the transcendental–
empirical method is briefly highlighted. In the past it has prompted me to pay attention to the 
meaning of both the social and the cultural–historical aspects of reality and to consider some 
implications for the nature of technology and tools. Stafleu does advance a new and insightful 
discussion of particular human skills characterised by different modal aspects.
Background observations
In his recent article on ‘Nuances in the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea’ Marinus Dirk 
Stafleu gives a critical appraisal of the differences between his own approach and the views 
of Dooyeweerd and myself (Stafleu 2014). He notes that we all share the same ultimate 
commitment, namely that God created everything according to God-ordained invariable laws. 
Stafleu furthermore holds that partial knowledge of God’s laws can be achieved by studying the 
law-conformity of creation. In particular he aims at discussing the relevance of artefacts to the 
future development of the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea (PCI).
Introductory remarks
Firstly, I want to express my appreciation and gratitude towards Stafleu for engaging in such 
a constructive way with the views articulated in my work Philosophy: Discipline of the disciplines 
([PDD] Strauss 2009).
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Sistematiese oorwegings in die Wysbegeerte van die Wetsidee. Stafleu het homself 
onderskei met baanbrekerswerk op die gebied van die teoretiese grondslae van die fisika. 
Hy het mettertyd sy blikveld verbreed en ook die terrein van die algemene filosofie betree 
– insluitende nadenke oor artifakte en tegnologie. In sy waardering van wat ek in my 2009 
werk oor filisofie as wetenskap van die wetenskappe gedoen het, het hy 'n aantal sake uitgelig 
waarop ek reageer in wat hieronder volg. In sommige gevalle blyk dit dat ons daarna streef om 
dieselfde stand van sake op verskillende maniere aan te dui, hoewel daar in ander gevalle egte 
uiteenlopende sienings na vore tree. Stafleu se beswaar teen die uitdrukking ‘soewereiniteit-
in-eie-kring’, naamlik dat geen modale aspek deur ’n soewerein geregeer word nie, openbaar 
'n misverstand rakende metaforiese taalgebruik, wat gevolglik aanleiding gee tot 'n kernagtige 
bespreking van analogieë en metafore. Die gekompliseerde uitdaging om ’n toepaslike 
aanduiding van die kern-sin van die fisiese aspek te vind ontvang ook aandag, sowel as die 
onderskeiding tussen modale wette en tipe-wette. Die aard van die transendentaal–empiriese 
metode word saaklik toegelig. In die verlede het dit daartoe aanleiding gegee dat ek ook 
aandag aan beide die sosiale en kultuur-historiese aspekte van die werklikheid sou gee en om 
sommige implikasies daarvan vir die aard van tegnologie en gereedskap aan die orde te stel. 
Stafleu bring inderdaad 'n nuwe en insigvolle diskussie oor besondere menslike vaardigheid 
na vore – wat telkens deur uiteenlopende modale aspekte gekarakteriseer word.
Scan this QR 
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Secondly, I have to mention that during my undergraduate 
studies I was already influenced by his significant published 
articles on the foundations of physics, notably his impressive 
1966 article on ‘Quantum physics and the philosophy of 
the Cosmonomic Idea’ (Stafleu 1966) and also other articles 
published by him (Stafleu 1968; 1970a; 1970b).
Thirdly, it should be mentioned that I was privileged to be 
instrumental in the publication of his penetrating systematic 
book [Time and again] on the foundations of physics which 
appeared as a joint venture of SACUM, Bloemfontein and 
Wedge Publishing Foundation, Toronto, Canada in 1980. 
Twenty-six years later I read: ‘I shall never forget his 
invaluable help in publishing my Time and again’ (Stafleu 
2006:173). This was indeed a pleasant reminder of his 
appreciation of the mediating role I had played in this regard.
Fourthly, it will turn out that many of the ‘disagreements’ 
highlighted by Stafleu are merely alternative emphases on 
ontic states of affairs owing to the inherent ambiguity of the 
language in which these realities are described.
Fifthly, in some instances straightforward misunderstandings 
create the appearance of disagreements. Of particular 
importance in this regard is the nature of scientific language 
and the role and place of concepts and metaphors within 
it. It is frequently stated by (natural and social) scientists 
that scholars ought to be precise in their choice of a subject-
specific terminology. Behind this quest one sometimes finds 
concealed an atomistic semantics, embodied in the assumption 
that a given word has only one (‘primary’) meaning. And 
often this postulated authentic meaning is identified with the 
etymology of the word.
However, in our actual language, scientific language 
included, practically all the basic terms employed allow 
for multiple meaning nuances. This reality opened up the 
way towards an acknowledgement of the semantic domain of 
words which Geckeler, Cosereiu and Trier explored in their 
Wortfeldt theory (literally: Wortfeld = word field) oriented 
to the use of Venn diagrams (see Coseriu [1966] 1978; Trier 
1973). These developments have a bearing on some of the 
critical remarks formulated by Stafleu. Let us start our 
response by looking at what he said about sovereignty and 
analogies.
Sphere sovereignty and analogical 
interconnections
Stafleu (2014) considers it unfortunate that I do not 
criticise the term ‘sphere sovereignty’. He points out that 
Dooyeweerd and I call the ‘mutual irreducibility of the 
modal aspects “sphere sovereignty”, as if there were a 
sovereign residing in each aspect’ (Stafleu refers to Strauss 
2009:456 and also to A new critique of theoretical thought 
(New critique) – Dooyeweerd 1997, I:101–102). According 
to Stafleu, the principle of sphere sovereignty is in the first 
place a ‘political principle’, applying ‘to all associations’. 
He states that ‘Herman Dooyeweerd interprets the political 
view of sphere sovereignty as the ontological principle of 
creational diversity’. And when Dooyeweerd applies the 
term ‘sphere sovereignty’ to the mutual irreducibility of the 
modal aspects Stafleu is of the opinion that he is ‘ignoring 
the fact that no modal aspect is ruled by a sovereign’ 
(Stafleu 2014).
 
This remark shows that the criticism raised against 
Dooyeweerd’s use of the principle of sphere sovereignty 
does not properly account for the mode of speech manifest 
in this expression, as applied both to the modal aspects and 
to the various type laws (individuality structures) holding 
for (natural and societal) entities. According to Dooyeweerd 
(1997), the uniqueness of every modal aspect is guaranteed 
by its indefinable meaning nucleus, which at once secures its 
irreducibility. Within each aspect‚ ‘points of connection‘ with 
other modal aspects are found, known as (retrocipatory and/
or anticipatory) analogies.
However, within the context of a theory of human society 
it should be realised that state absolutistic theories of 
sovereignty (commencing with Jean Bodin) have permeated 
modern theories of the state and law (just consider 
expressions such as state sovereignty, the sovereignty of 
law, and so on). Since such theories in principle extended 
governmental authority over all areas of life, it is 
understandable that within the context of legal and political 
discourse a slogan such as ‘sphere sovereignty‘ would be 
quite significant. Yet one should not conclude that the scope 
of the phrase ‘sphere sovereignty‘ has to be restricted to its 
employment within a societal context.
What are modal analogies?
But what are analogies? Stafleu remarks that it is correct 
to define analogical concepts ‘as having similarities and 
differences’. To this he adds that an analogy is a ‘logical 
relationship’ and then declares that ‘the relationships between 
the modal aspects are first of all ontological, not logical’.
Surely the issue concerns ontic (not ontological!) 
relationships between modal aspects. But it is mistaken to 
hold that ‘analogical concepts’ are intended, because having 
simila rities and differences is a trait of modal aspects, 
not of the analogical concepts capturing them. Consider an 
example which I found quite instructive in order to explain 
the nature of a modal analogy: the proximity of a President 
and his or her bodyguard is obvious. This proximity is an 
instance of spatial distance. Yet in terms of their respective 
positions within society they are far apart (social distance). 
The moment of similarity is given in distance but in this 
moment of similarity the difference is shown: spatial 
distance has an original spatial meaning whereas social 
distance analogically reflects the coherence between the 
spatial and social aspects. This inter-connection between 
these two modal aspects is more than merely logical, for it 
reveals an inter-modal ontic relatedness. The only ‘logical’ 
contribution entailed in the nature of an analogy is that 
the concept we have of it explores an understanding of 
this ontic relatedness through the gateway of the logical–
analytical aspect. In other words, we acquire analogical 
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concepts by identifying and distinguishing similarities and 
differences and they could be logical or non-logical. Since 
modal analogies concern at least two aspects, they can never 
be purely logical in nature. The similarity and difference 
captured in an analogical concept is more than logical in 
nature, whereas the angle of approach of such an analogical 
concept explores the logical aspect as point of entry.
Analogies and metaphors
From our example it is clear that an analogy is encountered 
when two aspects are similar in that respect in which they 
differ. We can expand this formulation by including all the 
ontic possibilities of embodying similarities and differences. 
Stafleu has already remarked that characters (individuality 
structures or natural and societal entities) display similarities 
and differences. Yet there are two other ontic possibilities: the 
analogical connections between aspects and entities and the 
analogical connections between entities and aspects. In PDD 
I have discussed all four possibilities (Strauss 2009:152–157). 
The important distinction advanced at this point is that 
modal analogies are unique in comparison to the other 
three, because they could only be ‘synonymised‘ but never 
replaced, as is the case with the other three. In the case of the 
other three, preferably designated as metaphors, it is always 
possible to replace one metaphor by using a different (and 
sometimes totally unrelated) one.
The account of (modal) analogies and three types of 
metaphors just mentioned explains why there is such a 
remarkable interconnection in play when it comes to the way 
in which we choose to describe aspects and entities. Consider 
for example the terms frequently employed by Van Riessen 
in his ‘Werkcolleges’ (Seminars) to explain that the modal 
functions of reality may also serve as ’toegangspoorten’ to 
reality (as points of entry to reality). In this case similarities 
and differences between modal aspects and entities (aspects 
as ‘gateways’) are explored. In contrast, once an entity has 
been identified, it turns out to be possible to use modal terms 
to talk about it. If one has identified a chair (its ‘whatness’), 
its different modes of being could be explored, for example 
by discerning its function within the quantitative aspect (how 
many chairs are there?), within the physical aspect (how 
strong is it?), within the economic aspect (how expensive is 
it?), and so on.
Moreover, in PDD I argued that both modal terms and 
metaphors could be used in a conceptual way or in a concept-
transcending way. When the Bible says that God is one, that 
God is life or that God is love, these modal terms (derived 
from the numerical, physical, biotical and moral aspects) are 
extended beyond their conceptual use (which is restricted to 
referring to realities merely present within the boundaries of 
a specific aspect).
The abovementioned distinctions suggest multiple options 
regarding the way in which one can designate the aspects 
of reality. Initially Dooyeweerd contemplated the expression 
‘domain categories’ (‘gebiedscategorieën’). Later on he coined 
expressions such as ‘aspects’, ‘law spheres’, ‘modal spheres’, 
‘modal functions’ and ‘functions’. In a work published in 
1931, Dooyeweerd exclusively employed the term ‘function’ 
for modal aspects – in spite of the fact that before and after 
that he did use and continued to use the other expressions 
mentioned.
In 2002 Stafleu introduced his preferential designation 
by introducing the phrase ‘relation frames’. Whereas 
Dooyeweerd’s term ‘sphere’ has a spatial connotation, 
most of the meaning nuances of the term ‘frame’ have an 
entitary connotation – such as framework, structure or scaffold. 
Such an approach is similar to calling aspects ‘gateways’ 
(‘toegangspoorten’). Also note that the term relation is derived 
from the meaning of the spatial aspect where we encounter 
continuous extension that is synonymous with a whole where 
all the parts are related in the sense of being connected, of 
cohering with each other. The continuity of cohering parts 
does not have any ‘gaps’. The term sphere has a spatial 
connotation, similar to the term relation, which is also derived 
from the meaning of space.
Jean Bodin (1981:222) introduced the term sovereignty into 
modern political science in order to capture the power of the 
state. This power could be understood in two ways: (1) as 
the competence over which an office-bearer dispose (such 
as a president or a king) or (2) it could be seen as the core 
meaning of the cultural–historical aspect of reality – in the 
sense of control, rule, mastery or cultural power.
Similarly to the way in which Stafleu (2002:17ff.) combined 
a spatial term (relation) and an entitary term (frame) in his 
designation of aspects as ‘relation frames’, Dooyeweerd 
(1997, I:102) combined a spatial term (sphere) with an entitary 
term (sovereignty) in his expression sphere sovereignty.
Combinations such as these, namely sphere sovereignty 
and relation frame, explore one of the possible domains 
of analogies, namely that of metaphors which designate 
analogical links between modal aspects and entities (A–E 
in terms of Strauss 2009:156). It conforms to the fact that 
metaphors could be exchanged, unlike modal analogies 
which could merely be ‘synonymised’, but never replaced. 
Given the freedom entailed in the creation of metaphors, it 
is therefore perfectly legitimate to use phrases such as sphere 
sovereignty and relation frame.
Let us investigate what actually happens when modal 
aspects are metaphorically designated as being sphere 
sovereign (sovereign within their own sphere). Identifying an 
aspect as sphere sovereign raises the question: What kind of 
metaphorical language use is at stake here? No purely logical 
meaning could be intended, because a modal aspect certainly 
is not ‘a sovereign’ nor does it have ‘a sovereign ruler’ as 
Stafleu, under the spell of a literal interpretation, remarks. 
Understood in a strictly logical sense the expression sphere 
sovereignty must contain an illogical element – comparable 
to a literal (logically stringent) understanding of the 
metaphor the ‘Lion of Western Transvaal’ – a human being, 
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such as General De la Rey, is certainly not an animal. Stafleu 
may want to contemplate the following remark of Max Black 
regarding the apparent ‘mystery’ of a metaphor. The question 
is what kind of ‘identification’ takes place in metaphorical 
language use? If it is understood in a strictly logical sense, 
the inevitable conclusion would be that something illogical 
is involved. Black (1979) discerns something similar in a 
metaphorical statement:
So perhaps the ‘mystery’ is simply that, taken as literal, a 
metaphorical statement appears to be perversely asserting 
something to be what it is plainly known not to be. (p. 21)
Whenever a metaphor is ‘taken as literal’, the impossible 
is asserted. This happens when metaphorical language, 
such as designating modal aspects as sphere sovereign, is 
understood literally, that is, in a strictly logical sense. Once 
the freedom of metaphorical language use is acknowledged, 
multiple metaphors may be constructed. Recently a 
programme on TV reported on developments within large 
cities where the roofs of large buildings are now used for 
food production. This is an important development because 
expanding cities worldwide increasingly diminishes the land 
available for agricultural purposes. The universal need for 
food production is captured by the presenter, who used the 
metaphor ‘food sovereignty’! And it should not surprise us 
that the well-known French philosopher of power, Michel 
Foucault, in his later development explored, in an account of 
race, the compound expression ‘bio-power’ (see the remarks 
of Michael Monahan [2013:286] in his review of Paul Taylor’s 
[2013] work, Race: A philosophical introduction).
Consider another example: When the mathematician Detlef 
Laugwitz (1986) discusses Cantor’s concept of a set in his 
work on ‘Infinitesimal Mathematics’, he highlights the 
presence of properly distinct elements and then concludes 
that in Cantor’s definition discreteness is dominant, and that 
it governs/rules:
Der Mengenbegriff ist von vornherein so angelegt worden, daß sich 
das Kontinuierliche seinem Zugriff entzieht, denn es soll sich nach 
Cantor bei einer Menge ja handeln um eine ‘Zusammenfassung’ 
wohlunterschiedener Dinge ... – das Diskrete herrscht. [‘From the 
outset, the set concept is constructed in such a way that what is 
continuous escapes from its grasp, for according to Cantor a set 
concerns the “bringing together” of properly distinct objects … – 
the discrete governs/rules.’] (p. 10)
Food is sovereign and the discrete reigns – two meaningful 
metaphors. A slightly different use of the ‘rule’ metaphor is 
found in a remark by E.T. Bell on Pythagorean mathematics: 
‘If “Number rules the universe” as Pythagoras asserted, 
Number is merely our delegate to the throne, for we rule 
Number’ (Bell 1965:16). In addition to a conceptual and 
concept-transcending use of modal terms, metaphors may 
also be employed to refer to realities transcending conceptual 
knowledge, as briefly mentioned earlier. Within the domain 
of the philosophy of science mention is sometimes made of 
root metaphors. Biblical expressions are also occasionally used 
to refer to God metaphorically, for example when the Bible 
speaks of God as Father or God as King (Sovereign).
In all these reflections it should be kept in mind that we 
are involved in conducting a transcendental–empirical 
investigation. It simply means that we are, in the light of 
our experience of the universe, aiming at finding out what 
underlies our actual experience in the sense of making 
it possible. But it never means that insights thus gained 
are not always provisional, improvable and fallible. The 
knowledge we obtain, as Stafleu correctly emphasises, 
is always ‘tentatively formulated’. Therefore, when Van 
Eikema Hommes (1972:7, 17, 66, 104) and I advocate a 
transcendental–empirical research method, no Kantian urge 
for ‘certain knowledge’ is intended and we also do not accept 
a split between what is transcendental and what is empirical 
– as Stafleu (2014) suggests with his remark: ‘However, this 
does not mean that there is a transcendental way to achieve 
knowledge of the laws (either natural or normative). These 
can only be discovered in an empirical way’.
We experience things and events in their (dis-)orderliness 
which point at God’s creation-order making possible 
whatever we experience.
Interestingly, Stafleu (2014) defines ‘science and the 
humanities as activities (theoretical or otherwise) directed at 
achieving knowledge about laws’, which immediately raises 
the question regarding the epistemic status of the science of 
history!
The meaning of the physical aspect
Stafleu (2014) and Sikkema (2005:20) give preference 
respectively to activity and action as core meaning of the 
physical aspect. Stafleu (2014) notes that he ‘always objected’ 
to designate this meaning nucleus as energy operation. 
However, in his abovementioned article on ‘Quantun 
physics and the philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea’ 
(1966) he does state that a physicist may be satisfied with 
Dooyeweerd’s choice of ‘energetische werkingswijze’ (literally: 
energetical mode of operation). Although ‘energetical’ 
is not an acknowledged English word, it is perhaps still 
more appropriate than energy. Stafleu (1966:129) explains 
that energy should not be identified with a measurable 
magnitude within a physically qualified individuality 
structure (Dooyeweerd’s term for many-sided natural and 
societal entities) but nonetheless may be used as a qualifier of 
the term ‘werkingswijze’ (mode of operation). My preference 
is to speak of energy operation as it is also explained in PDD, 
although it would also be acceptable to choose action or 
activity alternatively (Strauss 2009:89–90).
I pointed out that the expression interaction (suggested by 
Sikkema 2005:20) is compound because ‘inter’ is derived 
from space and therefore cannot be included in a description 
of the meaning nucleus of the physical aspect.
Action or activity is the equivalent of ‘operation’ in the 
expression ‘energy operation’. My suggestion was to use 
‘operation’, which will indeed also cover the quantum 
level. Therefore, if the term energy fails to apply to the 
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quantum level, the expression energy operation within such 
a context should be interpreted just to refer to ‘operation’ or 
‘action’. (A discussion of the ‘Energiesatz’ within quantum 
theory is found in Von Weizsäcker 2002:239–244.) In an 
email (personal comm., 24 May 2008) Stafleu mentions his 
preference for the term activity. This term is equivalent to 
the Greek word energeia. Energeia, in turn, is equivalent to 
working or operation (Keep in mind that Planck introduced 
a ‘Wirkungsquantum’ representing the relationship between 
energy and frequency.) In Aristotle’s philosophy it is related 
to what is designated as dunamis and to the act-potency 
scheme. I have to remind Stafleu that he introduced the 
term energeia in his email to me of 24 May 2008.
Acknowledging the energy-related meaning of the term 
energeia does not justify the objection made by Stafleu, namely 
that it may appear as if ‘antique Greek disciplines Strauss’s 
philosophy’. He does not realise that the Latin term actus, 
to which his term activity (and Sikkema’s [2005] term action) 
could be traced, is just the Latin equivalent of energeia – which 
would entail that ‘antique Greek disciplines’ all of us!
The fact of the matter is that we have to distinguish between 
the states of affairs upon which Greek philosophy stumbled 
and the philosophical context within which an account is 
given of what they were confronted with.
Before we return to the main line of Stafleu’s critical 
assessment, an elaboration of Dooyeweerd’s idea of 
individuality structures should be mentioned. Universal 
modal laws are specified by type laws (what Dooyeweerd 
calls ‘individuality structures’). However, as Stafleu points 
out, different type laws may share kind-related type laws. He 
mentions typical laws shared by electrons and the neutrino 
(such as their involvement in beta-radioactivity) and remarks 
that since electrons are electrically charged, they are ‘subject 
to Coulomb’s law, which neutrinos are typically not’.
Types of artefact
The idea of a law sphere is normally introduced with a view 
to the law side of a modal aspect (in the case of the norming 
aspects one may speak of norm spheres). Stafleu (2014) 
explains this as follows: ‘On the law side, natural frames are 
sets of natural laws; normative frames are sets of values and 
norms’. He assumes that ‘values or normative principles’ 
are ‘universal and invariant’. This formulation coincides 
with the way in which I characterised principles in PDD: 
‘A principle is a universal and constant point of departure’ 
(Strauss 2009:297).
According to Stafleu (2014), artefacts ‘have a character 
of their own, a set consisting of natural laws, normative 
principles and norms’. He holds that a norm is a positivised 
principle. Strangely he then says that the ‘application of 
culturally determined norms’ may cause ‘the universal 
character type of the state or the church’ to result in ‘a 
large variety of different characters of states and churches’. 
When he continues in the next sentence with the remark 
that these different characters of states and churches ‘can 
be compared with the help of the supposedly invariant 
normative character types’ then it is clear that the invariant 
character types are not multiplied into a ‘large variety of 
different characters of states and churches’, since actually 
it merely gives rise to different states and churches – on the 
factual side of reality.
In passing, we may note that Stafleu (2014) prefers to speak 
of the ‘subject and object side’ of an aspect, because he 
takes the term fact ‘to be an objective expression of human 
knowledge’. Dooyeweerd’s mature conception, which also 
represents my own preference, interprets the term ‘factual’ 
to embrace both the (factual) subject-side and the (factual) 
object-side of an aspect. What in an ontic sense is the case 
could be acknowledged in a statement of fact, without 
identifying the two. However, this appears to be more of a 
terminological difference than a(n) (f)actual difference.
Designating the cultural–historical 
and social aspects
Stafleu mentions my objection to the designation of the 
cultural–historical aspect as the techno-formative aspect, 
namely that it would restrict the meaning of this aspect to 
subject–object relations. His rebuttal is that the Greek term 
techne means skill, and people learn new skills from each 
other, implying a subject–subject relation. In spite of the 
terminological difference, we thus agree that this aspect 
should embrace both subject–subject and subject–object 
relations. However, it should be noted (as Van Riessen 
always emphasised in his lectures) that all subject–object 
relations are founded in subject–subject relations. 
Remark: Of course within the numerical aspect one does 
not find any subject–object relations – all numbers are 
arithmetical subjects: natural numbers, integers, rational 
numbers, real numbers, complex numbers and transfinite 
numbers (Cantor). The spatial aspect is the first one in which 
subject–object relations are found: two points demarcate a 
one-dimensional spatial subject, such as a straight line, but 
the points themselves are not extended in one dimension 
(Strauss 2013). The ‘point-of-intersection’ (a spatial object) of 
two intersecting lines (spatial subjects) mediates the subject–
subject relation between the lines. Another example is given in 
normal linguistic communicative acts. The physical sounds or 
signs are objectified in the lingual aspect in order to mediate 
the lingual interaction taking place. 
Moreover, the focus on skills remains directed at power over 
objects and should therefore be distinguished from cultural–
historical subject–subject relations. In the latter case we need 
the idea of an office. This issue is related to Stafleu’s (2004:130) 
proposal to introduce a ‘political aspect’ of ‘authority and 
discipline’ (to which I shall return below).
The meaning of the social aspect
I questioned Stafleu’s (2004) idea that the relation frame 
of keeping company does not imply authority because the 
features of both super- and subordination and the next-to-
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each-other reflect spatial analogies within all the normative 
contexts where we find both office-bearers and subordinates 
as well as coordinational relationships (Strauss 2009:506, 
note 1). Since I mentioned a similar criticism from Basden, 
Stafleu here referred to his response to Basden (2005:70ff.). 
However, in this 2005 article he wants to exclude 
‘authority’ from the social aspect. He proposes to call 
the social aspect ‘the relation frame of keeping company’ 
(Stafleu 2005:152 [companionship]; ibid:156 [company].) 
The paragraph heading on page 156 reads: ‘The relation 
frame of keeping company does not imply authority’. If 
one aims at accounting for the general modal structure of 
the social aspect (the ‘relation frame of keeping company’), 
one certainly has to disregard the typical way in which 
coordinational relationships, communal relationships and 
collective relationships specify the modal universality of the 
social aspect (in Dutch Dooyeweerd distinguishes between 
verbands-, gemeenschaps- and maatschapsverhoudingen). 
Coordinational relationships are distinguished from 
communal relationships and collective relationships in 
that the former lack relations of super- and subordination 
whereas the latter may have them. But owing to the fact 
that, for example, all collective relationships also function 
within the social aspect of reality, this functioning does not 
terminate the inherent relation of super- and subordination 
present within societal collectivities. Dooyeweerd is 
therefore fully justified in speaking of the ‘social authority 
function’ [‘sociale gezagsfunctie’]. He writes: ‘In a general 
sense the social function of authority reveals itself in the 
demand for respect from the socially inferior to the socially 
superior’ (Dooyeweerd 1931:161; Dooyeweerd 2010:140).
Not realising this caused Stafleu (2004) to restrict the social 
aspect to next-to-each-other relationships (i.e. coordinational 
relationships) and to characterise his new political aspect 
by relationships of super- and subordination. In Strauss 
(2006:chaps. 3, 4) I have subjected this entire issue to an 
extensive analysis by employing the distinction between the 
elementary basic concepts of sociology as a special science 
and the compound basic concepts of this discipline.
Stafleu calls upon a footnote in the second volume of 
Dooyeweerd’s magnum opus to conclude that Dooyeweerd 
gives preference to using the term social in the sense of 
‘embracing all modal aspects of society alike’ (Dooyeweerd 
1997, II:70). Yet I do not think this interpretation is correct. 
Since Dooyeweerd did not distinguish between a conceptual 
and a concept-transcending use of modal terms, he sometimes 
inserted a footnote to inform his readers in what sense he 
employs the term ‘social’. Initially I thought that he used 
‘social’ for the social law sphere and ‘societal’ for society as a 
whole, but it turned out that Dooyeweerd does not apply this 
scheme consistently. In the third volume of his New critique 
he mentions a ‘club as an historical form of organized social 
power’ and then adds a footnote stating the exact opposite 
of what Stafleu found on page 70 of the second volume: ‘The 
adjective “social” is here meant in the sense of “related to 
the modal aspect of social intercourse”’ (Dooyeweerd 1997, 
III:603, note 1).
Stafleu (2005:152) suggests that we should ‘avoid the 
expression “social aspect” … because it lacks precision’. 
Clearly, Stafleu wants to avoid using the term ‘social’ 
sometimes to refer to a modal aspect and at others in the sense 
of ‘embracing all modal aspects of society alike’. However, 
owing to the inevitability of employing modal terms in a 
conceptual context as well as in a concept-transcending way, 
it will be necessary to do away with the usual designations 
of all the modal aspects. The biotic meaning of the term life, 
for example, enables a conceptual use of this biotic term, 
such as when we refer to plants, animals and humans that 
are alive. But Christians read in the Scriptures that God is 
life – clearly a concept-transcending use of a term derived 
from the biotic aspect, similar to speaking of a life and world 
view which obviously exceeds the limits of a conceptual use 
of the term ‘life’.
It is therefore understandable that Dooyeweerd in fact 
continued to distinguish between the social aspect and its 
meaning nucleus: ‘omgang en verkeer’. I prefer to render this 
Dutch phrase by borrowing a term from Georg Simmel: 
‘Vergesellschaftung’ = ‘sociation’. Dooyeweerd frequently 
combines the aspect designation with the meaning nucleus, 
for example on the opening page of the first volume of a New 
critique, where he refers to ‘the aspect of social intercourse’ 
(Dooyeweerd 1997, I:3). And whenever he explains analogies 
of this aspect in other aspects he consistently maintains the 
word ‘social’. In the original Dutch edition of his work on 
the Crisis in humanist political theory he pays attention to the 
integrating function of the state whereas starting ‘out with 
the social analogies within the meaning of law’ (Dooyeweerd 
2010:139). He proceeds by speaking about the ‘social law 
sphere with its sociational or interactive meaning’ (Dutch: 
‘… den socialen wetskring met zijn omgangs- of verkeerzin’ – 
Dooyeweerd 1931:160).
In chapter 7 of his work on ‘action-freedom’ and ‘behavioural 
control’ Woldring introduces the suggestion to designate the 
core moment of the social aspect with the phrase ‘agogische 
interaktie’ (‘agogic interaction’ – Woldring 1976:135ff.). 
He responds to ideas of the sociologist R. van Dijk and 
understands the meaning of ‘agogologie’ in a broader sense 
as mere education or Bildung. He derives it from the Greek 
‘pedagogos’ pointing at a person who is a ‘child-guider’ 
(‘kinderbegeleider’) (ibid:135–136). Woldring primarily wants 
to account for being a fellow-human (ibid:134). Being a fellow-
human (‘medemens’) is, according to him, an undifferentiated 
basic notion, manifesting itself in differently qualified 
actions, such as economic, juridical, social and other kinds 
of action (ibid:134). But the way in which he understands the 
phrase agogic interaction is equally many-sided, for on the 
whole the agogical concerns helping humans in their striving 
towards self-education or self-disclosure (ibid:136). The term 
‘inter’ is derived from the spatial meaning of ‘between’ and 
the term ‘action’ analogically reflects the core meaning of 
the physical aspect – therefore ‘interaction’ does not have 
an original social meaning. Designating the core meaning 
(meaning nucleus) of an aspect should not contain analogies 
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of other aspects. The agogical appears to be an equally basic 
notion, on a par with ‘being a fellow-human’, but precisely 
for that reason its undifferentiated nature disqualifies it to 
be used as a designation of the meaning nucleus of the social 
aspect. Therefore, for the lack of a better term, I would prefer 
to stick to ‘sociation’.
While Dooyeweerd still accepted the discipline of sociology 
in 1931 as being delimited by the social aspect as angle 
of approach, he eventually opted for a social–philosophic 
understanding of the field of investigation of both 
philosophical sociology and positive sociology. In my work on the 
Reintegrating social theory I argued that if ‘positive sociology 
is indeed characterized by a social philosophic viewpoint, it 
inevitably becomes an integral part (a mere sub-discipline) of 
social philosophy’ (Strauss 2006:63).
When social forms of ‘interaction’ are systematically 
classified, alternative options provided by the analogies 
from the spatial aspect are specified. These options make it 
possible to distinguish between social intercourse on equal 
footing and social intercourse within the context of relations 
of super- and subordination – thus specifying two distinct 
spatial (dimensional) analogies within the social aspect: 
the vertical and the horizontal. Within space the number of 
dimensions highlights a numerical analogy on the law side.
When Stafleu remarks that ‘a sovereign is a political subject 
(whether a person or a government)’ he leaves aside the 
concept of the office occupied by a competent organ – for 
example the office of President within a constitutional state 
under the rule of law. The state is by definition more than just 
the government, because it embraces all citizens – including 
those in office and those acting as subjects within the state. 
It is therefore more appropriate to refer to an ‘office-bearer’ 
than to the ‘sovereign’ as ‘a political subject’.
Once a complex analysis has shown that the distinction 
between coordinational, communal and collective 
relationships (Dutch: ‘maatschapsverhoudingen’, 
‘gemeenschapsverhoudingen’ and ‘verbandsverhoudingen’) 
draws upon all the substratum functions of the social aspect, 
it should be clear that the social aspect cannot be identified 
merely with one of these specified forms of social functioning 
as Stafleu does with his abovementioned understanding 
of the ‘relation frame of keeping company’ which does not 
imply an element of ‘authority’.
The traditional distinction between law and morality 
illustrates a similar mistake. It claims that law is external, 
universal and binding whereas morality is supposed to be 
internal, particular and voluntary. In this view the meaning 
of the jural aspect is identified with the nature of a legal 
collectivity, such as the state (i.e. with a ‘regsverband’), 
whereas morality is identified with a moral coordinational 
relationship. However, when we consider moral relations 
within the nuclear family from the perspective of the children, 
then parenthood holds over all the children (universally), 
whereas the authority of the parents is external and binding. 
Any jural coordinational relationship, in contrast, displays 
the alleged features of morality, because, for example, 
entering into a civil contract requires an inner (voluntary) 
decision of a particular individual. Civil legal actions such as 
these therefore display the features traditionally assigned to 
morality, whereas the position of children within the nuclear 
family conforms to the traits traditionally ascribed to law!
A proper understanding of the universal modal structure 
of the social aspect precedes both the modal total concepts 
pertaining to the distinction between coordinational, 
communal and collective relationships and the typical 
concepts related to the type laws holding for societal entities 
that cannot be described merely in terms of one of their 
modal functions.
Once more: The cultural–historical aspect
Let us now return to the important analysis of different 
contexts of technology given by Stafleu. In order to do this 
we should note that perhaps the most important distinction 
needed to understand what Dooyeweerd and I mean by the 
cultural–historical modal aspect, is that between the concrete 
many-sidedness of the different kinds of events, on the one 
hand – and also differently qualified types of events (including 
natural processes) – and the different modal aspects of 
reality in which these events function, on the other hand. In 
its broadest sense, the idea of history encompasses the total, 
transmodal genesis and unfolding of creation. This integral 
process of becoming comes to expression in all the different 
modal aspects of reality. Acknowledging this integral 
perspective is a necessary and decisive presupposition for 
the identification and distinguishing of the different modal 
aspects distinguishable in any many-sided concrete process.
The adjective cultural (or cultural–historical) points at a 
specific mode of functioning; it designates one of the ways in 
which the on-going, dynamic existence of reality constantly 
manifests itself. In all cultural subject–object relations this 
modal aspect actualises the free formative fantasy of human 
beings – often also referred to as creativity. The archaeologist 
Narr formulated three criteria which could be applied 
to identify uniquely human artefacts: (1) The form of the 
produced tool may not be suggested or determined by the 
original raw material (e.g. in distinction from a stick from 
which irritating leafs and twigs need merely be removed); 
(2) the function of the tools may not be suggested (a rock 
in its natural shape is a strengthening of the fist; a stick 
an elongation of the arm or fingers), that is, tools may not 
be merely extended physical organs; and (3) the manner 
of production may not be suggested, with appeal to the 
technical moment which implies that tools must be formed 
by means of (formed or unformed) tools (cf. Narr 1988:281). 
The use and manufacturing of tools conforming to these 
three criteria concern the historical subject–object relation. 
It would be mistaken to designate this mode as the techno-
formative aspect, because such an indication would exclude 
historical subject-subject relations.
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Modal historical subject–subject relations concern formative 
control in inter-human association which are organised 
in societal structures with relations of authority and 
subordination. If the meaning of free formative control is 
rendered by using the synonymous term power, then the 
preceding distinction between subject–object and subject–
subject relations could be articulated by differentiating 
between power over objects and power over subjects. The 
legitimacy of power over other human beings requires the 
notion of office and the competence entailed in such an 
office. The authority with which a person occupying a certain 
office is endowed, legitimises that person's competence to 
concretise principles in the form of rules which other human 
beings ought to obey. This competence of an office-bearer, 
enabling the shaping and transformation of principles into 
rules of conduct which are valid within typical spheres of 
social intercourse, actually evinces a subjective moment 
functioning at the norm side of reality. Dooyeweerd speaks 
about the formative human will through which ‘normative 
principles’ are ‘positivised’ and then adds: ‘The human 
formative will is to be conceived of as a subjective moment on 
the law-side of these law-spheres themselves’ (1997, II:239).
In his critical treatment of Dooyeweerd's philosophy of 
history, C.T. McIntire (1985) argues against the existence of 
a historical modal aspect. One of his arguments concerns 
the ‘absence’ of historically qualified entities. Unfortunately 
he (and Stafleu) did not discuss Van Riessen's analysis of 
technique, where it is shown that since tools are made 
in order to make something else, they not only have a 
cultural foundational function, but are also qualified by the 
cultural–historical aspect. Another way of formulating this 
perspective is to say that it is typical of the most basic human 
tools that their ‘end’ is to be a ‘means’, since they are formed 
(their foundational function) in order to form or produce 
something else (their qualifying function)! Schuurman 
continues this characterisation in terms of a cultural 
foundational and qualifying function: ‘All technical objects 
are exceptional in the sense that both their foundational 
and qualifying function are cultural or technical in nature’ 
(Schuurman 2009:9ff.).
Alongside other typically human activities, cultural 
formation gives expression to the human calling to unfold 
the possibilities of creation. Dooyeweerd (1997, II:197–198) 
writes:
Mastery or control, in its original modal sense, elevates itself 
above what is given and actualized after a fixed pattern apart 
from human planning. It pre-supposes a given material whose 
possibilities are disclosed in a way exceeding the patterns given 
and realized by nature, and actualized after a free project of 
form-giving with endless possibilities of variation.
Within the cultural–historical aspect this relation of super- 
and subordination analogically reflects the meaning of the 
spatial aspect – where dimensionality and position find their 
original modal seat (respectively on the law side and the 
factual side).
Stafleu's appeal to the Greek meaning of the term techne 
relativises his own abovementioned objection to the term 
energeia. Therefore we may continue using the phrase energy 
operation – understood as the equivalent of incorporating the 
idea of ‘energeia/activity’.
Stafleu provides us with a new and insightful discussion 
of particular human skills characterised by different modal 
aspects, such as quantitative and spatial skills (related to 
mathematics); movement skills (the wheel exceeded by far the 
possibilities of walking); agriculture as a biotically founded 
technology (which includes the ‘transition from nomadic 
cattle breeding to agriculture’ whereas ‘biotechnology’ 
currently refers in a restricted way to ‘genetic manipulation’), 
and so on. But insofar as tools feature throughout his own 
analysis, what he achieves is merely complementary to 
what Van Riessen and Schuurman achieved with their 
claim that tools are founded in the cultural–historical aspect 
and qualified by it (see Schuurman 1980:10; Van Riessen 
1949:506–507).
Stafleu also raised the issue of time, the supra-temporal and 
eternity. Since he does not refer to the analysis which I gave 
of this problem in 2004 I am not going to respond to his 
remarks but rather ask him to read pages 176–180 of my 
2004 article which appeared in Philosophia Reformata (see 
Strauss 2004). Hopefully he may find my approach to this 
issue acceptable!
Conclusion
I hope to have shown that many of the apparent differences 
between Stafleu and me are actually mere terminological 
differences. In some instances he explored new avenues 
of thought which I appreciate and in other instances I 
introduced him to systematic distinctions which I have 
developed in other contexts (most likely not familiar to him). 
My appreciation of his thorough work on the theoretical 
foundations of physics has now been expanded because I am 
thankful for his insightful elaboration of modally directed 
technical skills, although I think the way in which Van 
Riessen and Schuurman account for the totality structure of 
tools is complementary to Stafleu’s approach.
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